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Brandishing the Cybered Bear: Information War and the 
Russia-Ukraine Conflict 
AZHAR UNWALA,  Georgetown University 
SHAHEEN GHORI, National Defense University 
Russia’s use of cyber power against Ukraine offered renewed insight to Russian cyber strategy and capabilities. This article 
dissects the Russia-Ukraine conflict by analyzing Russia’s strategic doctrine, tactical maneuvers, and capabilities in the 
information realm. Understanding the Russia-Ukraine conflict in this manner can inform and strengthen U.S. cyber policy and 
strategy. In particular, U.S. strategic planners and cyber professionals should consider internalizing Russian strategic thinking 
regarding cyber power and promote tactical improvements in resilience, intelligence, and information among itself and its 
allies. 
• Cyber power  Russia Ukraine Cyber strategy 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When Russian forces entered the Crimean Peninsula on March 2, 2014, they had already shut down 
Crimea’s telecommunications infrastructure, disabled major Ukrainian websites, and jammed the 
mobile phones of key Ukrainian officials. Undeniably, Russia’s use of cyber power was crucial in its 
offensive against Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. However, realizing the extent of Russia’s 
cyber power in this conflict requires grasping Russia’s strategic and tactical maneuvers in this 
domain. This article analyzes Russia’s cyber strategy and tactics against Ukraine in an effort to 
inform U.S. cyber policy. Part I surveys the strategic cyber doctrines of Russia and the United States. 
Part II examines a case study of Russia’s cyber power against Ukraine. Drawing upon insights from 
the Russia-Ukraine case, Part III offers strategic and tactical recommendations that the United 
States should employ as well as promote among its allies. 
I. DECIPHERING DOCTRINES: RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
 RUSSIA 
Understanding Russian cyber power in Ukraine requires conceptualization of Russia’s strategic 
thinking in this area. In official and unofficial doctrine, Russia typically refers to a holistic concept of 
“information war,” which encompasses cyber espionage, cyber attacks, and strategic communications.1 
Russia’s official view of cyber power stems from its Information Security Doctrine, dated September 9, 
2000. This document affirms a long-standing policy of state influence over the media, arguing that the 
government must ensure pro-Russian messaging regardless of whether media sources are state-
controlled or private. Yet the Doctrine’s language is largely defensive, and fails to mention any 
Russian state role in offensive cyber capabilities.2 The lack of state-sponsored cyber power was a 
characteristic of the April 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. In 
both cases, cyber attacks supporting Russian strategic goals were carried out by non-state hacking 
groups and were not positively linked to the Russian government.3 These attacks were largely 
unsophisticated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against government, media, and financial 
websites, and generated little lasting damage with limited payoff. Despite their tactical success in 
                                                 
 
1 Keir Giles, “’Information Troops’ – a Russian Cyber Command?” 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict (2011): 46. 
2 Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2008, http://archive.mid.ru//bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/2deaa9ee15ddd24bc32575d9002c442b!OpenDocument. 
3 Sergei Medvedev, “Offense-Defense Theory Analysis of Russian Cyber Capability,” U.S. Nav Postgraduate School (2015): 2-3. 
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 Estonia, the attacks did not lead to a pro-Russian outcome.4 Similarly, while cyber attacks initially 
overwhelmed Georgia’s defenses, Georgians simply restored denied websites on foreign servers.5 More 
importantly, these cases demonstrated strategic drawbacks to the lack of Russian state involvement 
in cyber attacks. First, non-state hacking groups may not possess the resources or skills for high-
impact cyber attacks that manifest lasting effects.6 Second, unsophisticated attacks can upset an 
adversary’s decision-making by adding a scenario that the defender must react to, but those attacks 
require organization and precision. In Georgia’s case, incoordination between hacking groups 
diminished the value of DDoS attacks by allowing Georgians to reconstitute their services on third 
party servers. The lack of coordination also produced indiscriminate attacks that included targeting 
Estonian and U.S. websites. This increased the assignment of blame for cyber attacks towards Russia, 
and may have risked escalating the conflict internationally.7 
The insights gained from Estonia and Georgia influenced the creation of The Military Doctrine of 
the Russian Federation, approved on February 5, 2010. This doctrinal update codified reforms to 
transition Russia’s mass-mobilization, Soviet-era military to a modern, highly mobile force. One of 
these reforms was the development of “forces and resources for information warfare,” acknowledging 
that future military conflicts will include an information component. In addition to providing 
improved information support to Russian armed forces, the directive explains information war’s 
function is “to achieve political objectives without the utilization of military force and, subsequently, 
in the interest of shaping a favorable response from the world community to the utilization of military 
force.”8 Further explanation of information war’s functions are highlighted in the Conceptual Views on 
the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Information Space, released on December 22, 
2011. Information war, according to the Views, aims to damage information systems and critical 
infrastructure, subvert political, economic, and social systems, instigate “mass psychological work on 
the population to destabilise the society and state,” and coerce targets to make decisions against their 
interests.9 Together, these two strategic documents suggest a greater state role in conducting 
information war as a central component of future conflicts. They also stress information war’s political 
functions, which in some cases may be more effective than the use of force.  
Unofficial sources also expose aspects of Russia’s information war strategy.10 One authoritative 
source is Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, who outlined necessary approaches for 
21st century warfare in a 2013 article.11 Gerasimov recognizes that future conflicts must include an 
information element, which can asymmetrically lower an adversary’s combat potential in addition to 
creating “a permanently operating front through the entire territory of an enemy state…” According to 
Gerasimov, modern warfare should also rely on covert action, special-operations forces, and private 
contractors until the final stages of a conflict when success is guaranteed.  
 A number of implications can be drawn from the development of Russia’s information war 
doctrine. First, the Russian state will be involved in coordinating and executing information war. 
These operations will largely be covert, and involve special-operations and contractor forces. Second, 
Russia will use information war prior to and during a conflict to understand an enemy, build support 
for military action, isolate the enemy informationally and internationally, and undermine the enemy’s 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 21. 
5 Ibid. 22-25.  
6 Max Strasser, “Why Ukraine Hasn’t Sparked a Big Cyberwar, So Far,” Newsweek, March 18, 2014, 
http://www.newsweek.com/why-ukraine-hasnt-sparked-big-cyberwar-so-far-232175.  
7 Ronald J. Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski, and Masashi Crete-Nishihata, “Cyclones in Cyberspace: Information Shaping and Denial 
in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 1 (February 2012): 16-18; and Timothy L. Thomas, “The 
Consequences of August 2008,” in Russian Information Warfare Theory (Strategic Studies Institute, 2010): 279-282.  
8 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, The School of Russian and Asian Studies, 2010, 
http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010. 
9 Keir Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues,” 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (2012): 67-68.   
10 For a summary of unofficial sources regarding Russia’s information war strategy prior to 2013, see Stephen Blank, “Russian 
Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 31 (2013): 34-37.  
11 Valery Gerasimov on Mark Galeotti’s blog, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” February 27, 2013, 
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/.  
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combat response. Third, information war will aim to undermine an enemy’s state and societal 
functions, coerce adversaries, and disseminate a pro-Russian narrative of the ensuing conflict.  
 UNITED STATES 
Addressing the Russian doctrine for information war also warrants an analysis of U.S. doctrine, 
codified in the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s JP 3-12 Cyberspace Operations (February 2013), JP 3-13 
Information Operations (November 2014), and most recently the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 
Cyber Strategy (April 2015). According to JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations (CO) are composed of the 
military, intelligence, and ordinary business operations of the DoD in and through cyberspace.12 The 
DoD categorizes CO as offensive, intended to project power by the application of force; defensive, 
intended to defend DoD or other friendly cyberspace; or internal, taken to design, build, configure, 
secure, operate, and sustain DoD communications systems. Notably, the United States does not 
restrict its operations by classifying them as only defensive; rather it enables a full spectrum of CO for 
a variety of purposes. Under this document, future CO produced by the United States—such as 
Stuxnet—as well as defense programs, possess protocols for their use.  
Information Operations (IO) guidelines are defined in Joint Publication 3-13 (November 2014) as 
the integrated employment, during military operations, of Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) in 
concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, or corrupt the decision making of 
adversaries and potential adversaries.13 Through incorporating changes to this document, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff are emphasizing the role information operations will have in future conflict; however, 
they have limited themselves to employing IO only during military operations. This might indicate 
that the United States believes that IO are only beneficial during military operations. A further 
limitation to U.S. IO is that they are used in conjunction with other lines of operation, such as 
cyberspace operations, public affairs, strategic communication, and key leader engagement,14 not as 
their own offensive strategy.  
Moreover, the Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy (April 2015) outlines the strategic direction 
that cyber operations are heading as well as evaluating the current threats that the government faces. 
The strategic goals are as follows: 
1. Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities  
2. Defend the DoD Information Network 
3. Be prepared to defend the U.S. Homeland and U.S. vital interests 
4. Build and maintain robust international alliances to deter shared threats and increase 
international security and stability15 
The fourth goal highlights that cyber threats create security and stability issues and mentions 
alliances as a future focus area. It is possible that referring to allies relates to defending against cyber 
attacks against key NATO allies and Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNAs). The United States also 
realizes the need for cyber cooperation so that weaker states cannot be held prey when targeted by 
cyber attacks. By publishing this document, the United States acknowledges the current deficiencies 
in addressing cyber threats while formulating plans to solve them over the next five years. 
Several implications can be drawn from the United States’ doctrines of information war. First, the 
United States views cyberspace as a critical area to improve over the next couple of years. Funds, 
manpower, and attention are all shifting to strengthen America’s position in this developing field. 
Second, while IO are achieving more focus, they are limited in their employment due to the guidelines 
set forth in JP 3-12. Finally, the U.S. doctrines are reactionary and living, changing whenever new 
events take place and projecting ambiguity when dealing with developing problems. In the case of the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States did not have a strong response to Russian cyber assaults 
on Ukraine.  
                                                 
12 “Cyberspace Operations,” Joint Publication 3-12, U.S. Department of the Army, February 5, 2013, 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf.  
13 “Information Operations,” Joint Publication 3-13, U.S. Department of the Army, Originally published November 2012, 
updated November 27, 2014, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf.  
14 Ibid.  
15 The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, April 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf.  
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 II. EXAMINING THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT 
The 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict offers a valuable case study of Russia’s information war strategy. It 
is important to note that Russia initiated offensive cyber operations against Ukraine as early as 2009 
as a part of a broader information war campaign against NATO and EU countries.16 It was only in 
March 2014 that information war operations intensified against Ukraine. In that month, the Russian 
parliament authorized military force in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin signed legislation 
incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation, and Russian military forces amassed along the 
Ukrainian national border.17 The following section outlines the three pillars of Russia’s information 
war campaign against Ukraine: cyber espionage, cyber attacks, and strategic communications.  
 ESPIONAGE 
Russia’s espionage efforts relied upon standard open-source information collection,18 as well as 
interception of Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure and targeted cyber operations. 
Intercepting Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure was logical for Russia. First, most 
Ukrainian telecommunications systems rely on Russia for manufacturing or maintenance of the 
technology. In fact, the most common backdoor into Ukrainian systems utilized by the Ukrainian 
government for surveillance was modeled after the Russian KGB intercept system. Second, Russian 
mobile telecommunications firms such as Vimpelcom and MTS held a considerable portion of the 
Ukrainian market; MTS held the second largest market share in September 2013.19 Since it is widely 
suspected that the Russian government collaborates with private companies, it is safe to assume that 
the Russian government possessed ownership insight into most Ukrainian telecommunications 
infrastructure.20 This is evident by the text messages many participants of an anti-Russian 
demonstration in Kiev received, reading, “Dear subscriber, you are registered as a participant in a 
mass disturbance.”21  
Russia also employed cyber espionage operations targeting the computers and networks of 
journalists in Ukraine, as well as Ukrainian, NATO, and EU officials. Some operations were already 
underway well before the conflict began. The Sandworm espionage operation, which exploited a 
previously unknown Windows vulnerability, had started as early as 2009 and targeted EU and NATO 
telecommunications infrastructure through 2014. Sandworm’s malware had intensified and targeted 
Ukrainian government networks during September 2014, which coincided with the NATO summit in 
Wales.22 Other espionage operations began closer to the conflict. Operation Armageddon began in mid-
2013 to target Ukrainian government, law enforcement, and military officials. This occurred just as 
Ukraine and the EU commenced active negotiations for an Association Agreement, which Russia 
publicly deemed a national security threat.23 As anti-government protests began in Ukraine, an 
advanced malware named ‘Snake’ infected the Ukrainian prime minister’s office and several 
embassies outside the country.24 Furthermore, Operation Potao began as Russia commenced its 
invasion of Crimea, targeting computers and mobile communications of Ukrainian officials and news 
agencies.25 
                                                 
16 “Russian Cyber Espionage Campaign – Sandworm Team,” iSight Partners (2014): 1-11.   
17 Kenneth Geers, “Strategic Analysis: As Russia-Ukraine Conflict Continues, Malware Activity Rises,” FireEye Blogs (2014): 
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/05/strategic-analysis-as-russia-ukraine-conflict-continues-malware-activity-rises.html. 
18 “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” Financial Times, August 28, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-
00144feabdc0.html. 
19 Patrick Tucker, “Why Ukraine Has Already Lost The Cyberwar, Too,” Defense One (April 2014): 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/04/why-ukraine-has-already-lost-cyberwar-too/83350/.  
20 Ibid; and “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War.” 
21 Ibid.  
22 “Russian Cyber Espionage Campaign – Sandworm Team.” 
23 “Operation Armageddon: Cyber Espionage as a Strategic Component of Russian Modern Warfare,” LookingGlass Cyber 
Threat Intelligence Group (April 2015): 3-9.  
24 David E. Sanger and Steven Erlanger, “Suspicion Falls on Russia as ‘Snake’ Cyberattacks Target Ukraine’s Government,” 
New York Times, March 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/world/europe/suspicion-falls-on-russia-as-snake-
cyberattacks-target-ukraines-government.html.   
25 Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherepanov, “Operation Potao Express,” ESET Report (July 2015): 9-13.  
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The timing and construction of these espionage operations indicated Russian state involvement, 
particularly by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).26 In many cases, the deployed malware 
was consistently updated in a formal code development environment with Russian time and language 
settings.27 Malware was also tailored towards specific, high-level targets for use in spear-phishing and 
whaling operations.28 Most espionage malware payloads consisted of Microsoft Office or Adobe files 
that held seemingly legitimate reports regarding EU strategic competiveness and energy, lists of 
Russian sympathizers and “terrorist” actors, and briefings of recent developments in the Ukraine 
conflict.29 Even operations targeting journalists held lures regarding publication opportunities.30  In 
Operation Potao’s case, the payloads included a modified encryption service containing a backdoor for 
Russian access.31 The operations were also constructed to avoid discovery and attribution; the 
malware often contained unused machine instructions, obfuscated strings, and counter-analysis 
capabilities.32 In the case of ‘Snake’, the malware garnered full remote access to a compromised 
system while blending in with network traffic to avoid detection.33  
Russia’s advanced espionage techniques provided the Kremlin with insight to Ukrainian, EU and 
NATO strategic intentions to support Russian strategy. They also enabled Russia to monitor 
Ukraine’s strategic thinking in real time. Furthermore, targeting journalists permitted Russia to 
monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, and create avenues to spread disinformation and pro-
Russian messaging.34  
 CYBER ATTACKS 
A number of cyber attacks intending to disrupt or destroy targets were carried out in Ukraine. Like 
the Estonia and Georgia cases, pro-Russian, non-state hacking groups performed a variety of cyber 
attacks. One group based in Ukraine called Cyber Berkut was especially prominent. Cyber Berkut 
executed DDoS attacks and defacements against Ukrainian and NATO webpages,35 intercepted U.S.-
Ukrainian military cooperation documents,36 and attempted to influence the Ukrainian parliamentary 
elections by disrupting Ukraine’s Central Election Commission network.37 While it is possible that the 
Russian government supported these groups clandestinely, the unsophisticated and indiscriminate 
nature of attacks indicates minimal coordination or cooperation with the Kremlin.38 Additionally, just 
as Estonia and Georgia demonstrated, these non-state attackers generated nominal damage. That is 
not to say their strategic role was irrelevant; it is likely that these hacking groups fomented confusion 
                                                 
26 Robert Hackett, “Russian cyberwar advances military interests in Ukraine, report says,” Fortune, April 29, 2015, 
http://fortune.com/2015/04/29/russian-cyberwar-ukraine/; and Jen Weedon and Laura Galante, “Intelligence Analysts Dissect the 
Headlines: Russia, Hackers, Cyberwar! Not So Fast.” FireEye Blogs, March 12, 2014, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-
perspective/2014/03/intel-analysts-dissect-the-headlines-russia-hackers-cyberwar-not-so-fast.html.  
27 “APT 28: A Window Into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?” FireEye Special Report, (2014): 24. 
28 Ibid. 6, 20. 
29 Aarti Shahani, “Report: To Aid Combat, Russia Wages Cyberwar against Ukraine,” NPR, April 28, 2015, 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/04/28/402678116/report-to-aid-combat-russia-wages-cyberwar-against-ukraine.  
30 “APT28,” (2014): 9-12.  
31 Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherepanov 2015: 14.  
32 Ibid. 5.  
33 Tim Maurer and Scott Janz, “The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Cyber and Information Warfare in a Regional Context,” The 
International Relations and Security Network, October 17, 2014, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital- 
Library/Articles/Detail/?id=184345.  
34 “APT28,” (2014): 10-11. 
35 Petro Zamakis, “Cyber Wars: The Invisible Front,” Ukraine Investigation, April 24, 2014, http://ukraineinvestigation.com/cyber-
wars-invisible-front/.  
36 CyberBerkut, http://cyber-berkut.org/en/. 
37 “Hackers Target Ukraine’s Election Website,” Agence France-Presse, October 25, 2014, http://www.securityweek.com/hackers-
target-ukraines-election-website.  
38 Jen Weedon and Laura Galante, “Intelligence Analysts Dissect the Headlines: Russia, Hackers, Cyberwar! Not So Fast.” 
FireEye Blogs, March 12, 2014, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2014/03/intel-analysts-dissect-the-headlines-
russia-hackers-cyberwar-not-so-fast.html. 
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 and disarray among their targets,39 undermined the Ukrainian state’s credibility among its people,40 
and intimidated Ukraine’s allies.41  
Additionally, a variety of cyber attacks can be linked to the Russian government. On February 28, 
2014, shortly after then-President Victor Yanukovych fled Ukraine, armed Russian soldiers bearing 
no insignia took over the Simferopol International Airport, the Crimean Peninsula’s main airport.42 
Similar unmarked soldiers took over a Ukrtelecom building in Sevastopol, a city in southwestern 
Crimea.43 Ukrtelecom, Ukraine’s National Telecommunications operator, subsequently issued a report 
claiming that the soldiers “seized several communications hubs in Crimea,” tampered with Crimean 
fiber optic cables, and damaged its optical fiber and conductor units.44 The Russian soldiers also 
equipped the remaining active fiber optic cables with data intercept devices.45  
The logic behind these events can be explained by understanding Ukraine’s telecommunications 
geography. Ukraine’s Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were decentralized and held terrestrial and 
satellite path diversity to the rest of the world.46 This system differed from Georgia’s, which could only 
access the Internet by traversing Russian and Turkish infrastructure.47 As a result, isolating Ukraine 
from telecommunications was slightly more difficult as it required Russian forces to target key cyber 
terrain at operationally decisive points. Luckily for Russia, Crimea was one of the vulnerable areas in 
Ukraine since it only held one Internet Exchange Point (IXP) that connected the peninsula to the rest 
of the country. If Crimea’s IXP were damaged or shut down, Crimea would be completely isolated, 
allowing Russia to control the region’s communications.48 Furthermore, hampered communications 
services would short-circuit Ukraine’s crucial support services from assisting Crimea in the event of a 
conflict with Russia. Military operations in addition to first-aid, fire and rescue services would be 
unable to provide relief to the region, forcing the Crimean people to rely on Russia.49 Furthermore, 
Russia would monitor any residual communications in or out of Crimea, providing them with precise 
intelligence on Crimea’s interactions with the rest of Ukraine. 
 Russia’s logic proved successful. Once Crimea was completely isolated, Russian troops entered 
the region with little difficulty on March 2.50 Immediately afterwards, multiple Ukrainian 
government, news, and social media websites were shut down and the mobile phones of Ukrainian 
officials and parliament members were hacked or blocked for the next three days.51 Given the 
timeliness of these attacks, it is possible that Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) directed them.52  
Combined with attacks on Crimean telecommunications prior to Russia’s invasion, the post-invasion 
cyber attacks significantly lowered the response potential of the Ukrainian government. First, 
Ukrainian officials were unable to communicate with Crimean sources on the ground to acquire an 
                                                 
39 Tim Maurer and Scott Janz 2014.  
40 Mark Clayton, “Ukraine election narrowly avoided 'wanton destruction' from hackers,” Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 
2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers-video.  
41 Max Cherney, “Pro-Russian Hackers Took Down Three NATO Websites,” Motherboard, March 16, 2014, 
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/pro-russia-ukranians-hack-nato-websites; and Thomas Barrabi, “NATO Not 
Responsible For Ukraine's Security From Russia, Should Focus On Member Nations, Latvian Envoy Says,” International 
Business Times, May 6, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/nato-not-responsible-ukraines-security-russia-should-focus-
member-nations-latvian-1910551.  
42 “Feb. 28 Updates on the Crisis in Ukraine,” The New York Times: The Lede, February 28, 2014, 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/latest-updates-tensions-in-ukraine/.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 “The Ukrainian Crisis – A Cyber Warfare Battlefield,” Defense Update, April 5, 2014, http://defense-
update.com/20140405_ukrainian-crisis-cyber-warfare-battlefield.html.  
46 Sanja Kelly et al., “Freedom on the Net 2014,” Freedom on the Net (Freedom House, 2014): 820-1.  
47 John Markoff, “Web becomes a battleground in Russia-Georgia conflict,” The New York Times, August 12, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12iht-cyber.4.15218251.html.  
48 Jason Rivera, “Has Russia Begun Offensive Cyberspace Operations in Crimea?” Georgetown Security Studies Review, March 
2, 2014, http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/03/02/has-russia-begun-offensive-cyberspace-operations-in-crimea/. 
49 “Feb. 28 Updates on the Crisis in Ukraine.”  
50 Tim Maurer and Scott Janz 2014.  
51 Ibid. 
52 “The Ukrainian Crisis – A Cyber Warfare Battlefield.”  Defense Update 2014.  
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accurate understanding of the ensuing conflict. Second, Ukrainian officials were unable to share 
information or execute command and control processes among themselves. Third, Ukrainian officials 
were unable to communicate with foreign allies, placate pro-Russian Ukrainians, or make efforts to 
undermine Moscow.53 In this way, Russian strategic planners were able to operate several steps ahead 
of their Ukrainian counterparts during the conflict. 
 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
A central component of Russia’s information war on Ukraine was the body of online communications 
disseminated by Russian officials, journalists, and media sources to promote a pro-Russian view of the 
conflict. This strategy is an extension of Russia’s domestic media policies. The Internet is one of the 
few remaining avenues to express popular dissent within Russia, since television is almost exclusively 
state-controlled and a common outlet for the Putin administration.54 As a result, the Russian 
government invests heavily in analyzing and influencing online media pipelines.55 Against Ukraine, 
Russia supported journalists, bloggers, and individuals within social media networks to broadcast pro-
Russian narratives.56 In one case, Russia paid a single person to hold multiple different web 
identities. One actor in St. Petersburg conveyed that she was acting as three different bloggers with 
ten blogs, while also commenting on other sites.57 Another individual was employed to simply 
comment on news and social media 126 times every twelve hours.58 Interestingly, pro-Russian online 
media also mimicked anti-Russian sources. The website Ukrainskaya Pravda was a pro-Russian 
version of the popular Ukrainian news site Ukrains’ka Pravda. These pro-Russian sources would 
communicate false narratives about actual events, such as denying the presence of Russian military 
in Ukraine59 or blaming the West for conducting extensive information war against Russia.60 Another 
example is the dissemination of images depicting columns of refugees fleeing Ukraine to Russia, when 
in reality they were daily traffic between Ukraine and Poland.61 Along these lines, a pro-Russian web 
presence misled Ukrainian citizens, journalists, and other onlookers to the conflict seeking reliable 
sources of information.62  
Russia’s strategic communications also alienated Ukraine from its allies. This relied upon the 
dissemination of doctored images. For example, pro-Russian media sources would spread photos of 
Ukrainian tanks, flags, and soldiers altered to bear Nazi symbols in an effort to associate the 
Ukrainian government with resurgent Nazism. These tactics were especially provocative as some 
European countries like Germany are revolted by their Nazi history and were likely to distance 
themselves from Ukraine.63 In other cases, hacking groups leaked privileged information, such as the 
controversial telephone conversation between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and 
U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt, which may have embarrassed the United States.64  
                                                 
53 Weedon and Galante 2014.  
54 Sacha Dov Bachmann and Hakan Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in the East: The Integral Nature of the 
Information Sphere,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs: International Engagement on Cyber V (2015): 199-200.  
55 “Russia Update: Defense Ministry Plans New Computer Programs to Monitor, Analyze Social Media,” The Intepreter 
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 Russia also utilized television to generate support for intervention in Crimea. Here, the narrative 
was that Moscow must invade Crimea to protect native Russian speakers from danger.65 State-backed 
outlets such as RT and Channel One frequently presented violent, suspense-filled coverage of the 
Ukraine conflict. A notable excerpt of this coverage was of a crying woman describing Ukrainian 
soldiers crucifying a baby and killing his mother.66 This story was false,67 as were numerous stories 
broadcasted across Russian television. Just as a single individual would operate multiple online 
personas, particular individuals would espouse multiple television personas purporting false 
anecdotes. Across multiple TV channels, the same weeping women and injured men would be 
identified as “a soldier’s mother,” then an “Odessa resident,” and then an “anti-Maidan activist,” all 
recounting different injustices they faced against the Ukrainian state.68 This tactic was especially 
useful after Russia’s unmarked troops isolated Crimea’s communications infrastructure. Ukrainian 
channels were subsequently taken off the air and replaced with Russian state channels, which 
enabled pro-Russian activists in the region to gain legitimacy against the Ukrainian state.69  
A final component of Russia’s strategic communications strategy was denying official Russian 
involvement in attacks until the later stages of the conflict.70 Drawing upon the disinformation 
advanced by Russian media, Moscow’s denial prevented a quick response from the West.71 At the 
same time, Moscow constantly communicated the necessity of de-escalating the conflict, which 
obscured its strategy to NATO and the EU.72 In this manner, Russia leveraged its strategic 
communications to operate within Western decision-making and reduce the costs of its actions against 
Ukraine.73 Once President Putin admitted the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, he had already 
completed Crimea’s annexation.74  
 
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Russia’s success against Ukraine demonstrates the value of doctrinal improvements to its information 
war strategy after the Estonia and Georgia conflicts. A couple of broad strategic insights can be 
gained by analyzing Russia’s information war tactics in this case. First, the role of state-led, covert 
cyber offensives was crucial in penetrating Ukrainian state apparatuses to achieve intelligence from 
high-value targets, as well as disabling key portions of Ukrainian cyber terrain to augment Russia’s 
ground objectives. While non-state hacking groups assisted Russia in fomenting disarray within 
Ukrainian decision-making and response apparatuses, they alone were insufficient in achieving 
Russia’s objective of annexing Crimea. Second, components of Russia’s information war operated 
synergistically to continuously support Moscow’s advantage in the conflict. Intelligence acquired from 
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cyber espionage supported Russia’s cyber attacks and strategic communications. Cyber attacks 
disabled Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian strategic communications and cyber espionage. Strategic 
communications undermined the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state to its citizens and allies, enabling 
Russian cyber attacks and espionage to succeed without robust responses from Ukrainian society and 
its foreign partners.75 Third, Russia demonstrated the potential of applying information war concepts 
to kinetic war tactics. The problem of identifying Russia’s unmarked soldiers in Crimea mirrored the 
difficulties in attributing cyber operations to a particular actor. In both cases, concealment of identity 
lowered the costs of Russia’s actions–there was little to no kinetic response to Russia’s kinetic 
operation. This kinetic operation also possessed objectives in the cyber realm. By using land forces to 
damage communications and isolate Crimea, Russia demonstrated further synergistic possibilities 
between the cyber and physical domains.  
It is possible that this synergistic potential of warfare is only realized through Russia’s holistic 
conceptualization of “information war,” rather than the U.S. categorization of cyberspace operations 
versus information operations, military information versus non-military information, and offensive 
capabilities versus defensive capabilities. For the United States, the “information war” concept is 
divided up into different doctrines and policies as if it were another physical domain of war. On the 
other hand, those distinctions and divisions are largely irrelevant for Russia. As the Ukraine conflict 
demonstrates, the information battlefield exists everywhere. The distinctions between combatant and 
non-combatant are blurred as civilians are targeted and utilized as part of broader information 
campaigns to support Russian strategic military goals. Moreover, traditional conceptions of offense 
and defense are erased as attacks on key Ukrainian cyber terrain enable Russia to defend itself by 
denying possible Ukrainian escalatory responses.76 Along these lines, the United States must 
internalize these strategic concepts to prepare itself for similar dynamic, synergistic, and hybrid 
conflicts involving the information sphere. 
In a similar vein, the United States must improve its efforts to defend and counter Russian 
information war tactics. In light of Russia’s maneuvers against Ukraine, the United States should 
promote improvements in resilience, intelligence, and information among itself and its allies.  
 RESILIENCE  
Russia’s success was partly attributed to Ukraine’s inability to defend itself or adequately respond to 
Russian cyber attacks. While Ukrainian hacker groups did respond to Russia’s cyber offensives, these 
attacks were often website defacements or denial or service, and contributed little to preventing 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea.77 Furthermore, Ukraine—and Crimea, especially—had no way to 
counter Russia’s cyber operations once their systems were shut down. This was due to growing 
vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s cyber defense architecture,78 as well as the geography of its 
telecommunications infrastructure. One IXP for the entirety of Crimea allowed Russia to extinguish 
all online and mobile communications, rendering the region completely vulnerable.  
In order to prevent this effect, the United States should promote a policy of structural 
diversification of key telecommunications nodes and exchange points. With U.S. guidance, Ukraine 
can develop its Internet infrastructure by opening up multiple IXPs for its regions to prevent 
susceptibility of physical damage to telecommunications and isolation from the rest of the country. 
Opening up additional IXPs carries additional benefits besides maintaining security, such as cost, 
latency, and bandwidth.79 Increasing the bandwidth passing through an exchange will allow Ukraine 
to reduce the damage caused by DDoS attacks, since the provider would be able to handle and process 
more Internet traffic.  
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 Another way to sustain resilience from a DDoS attack is to pay networking companies to allocate 
more bandwidth through Internet providers.80 The United States can aid Ukraine and other allies in 
the future by filtering unnecessary Internet traffic so that businesses in the host country can continue 
their operations. The United States successfully mitigated a DDoS campaign against its banks in 2012 
by maintaining tight control of their networks81 and redirecting unauthorized traffic to other servers. 
An international effort can also be taken to help break down botnets that aid in DDoS operations. 
Soliciting private companies to monitor traffic traveling through IXPs will help attribute the bots used 
in these attacks. In the case of the DDoS attack against U.S. banks, the United States government 
appealed to more than 100 countries to choke off debilitating computer traffic nodes around the 
world.82  
Additionally, one major issue for Ukraine is its dependence on Russia for manufacturing and 
maintenance of its telecommunications systems. Obtaining this technology from Russia generates 
supply chain vulnerabilities planted by Russian corporations on behalf of Moscow. Along these lines, 
the United States should assist Ukraine in finding alternative sources for its telecommunications 
infrastructure that are trustworthy, less susceptible to Russian tampering, and contain built-in 
security measures.  
 INTELLIGENCE 
Another aspect of Russia’s success was Ukraine’s inability to proactively detect and defend itself from 
the onslaught of Russian state and non-state cyber attacks. As a result, more robust intelligence 
cooperation on cyber intelligence and research is warranted. For cyber incidents that were committed 
by non-state groups, the United States and its allies need to rely upon intelligence to predict future 
cyber attacks. Most cyber criminal organizations coordinate and plan their cyber offensives through 
messaging boards.83 Tracking messaging boards for Russian cyber group activity may provide 
valuable insight as to what websites, systems, and infrastructure will be attacked prior to the 
operation itself.  
An added measure to confuse or delay cyber criminals is to modify the communications technology 
that criminals compromise. In his latest testimony, Admiral Rogers, director of USCYBERCOM, 
spoke of new cyber detection technologies that can relay false information to cyber attackers in order 
to impede their objectives.84 This program or hardware can be shared to protect allies’ systems from 
both cyber criminal groups and state-sponsored attacks.  
 
 INFORMATION 
Strategic communications and information operations played a critical role in U.S. and Russian 
strategies during the Cold War, yet the vigor of these campaigns was lost after the conflict abated. 
Russia’s maneuvers in Ukraine were still reminiscent of its operational deception tactics–
maskirovka—during the Cold War.85 The United States continues to devote resources to information 
operations, adapting to the advent of social media. In 2011, U.S. Central Command contracted a 
California corporation to develop what is described as an “online persona management service” that 
allows one U.S. serviceman or woman to control up to ten separate identities based all over the 
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world.86 The goal of this contract was to manipulate these fake online personas to influence Internet 
conversations and spread pro-American propaganda.87 Another limited U.S. counter-effort came from 
the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a federal agency overseeing the Voice of America and similar 
radio stations aimed at the Middle East, Cuba, and Asia, who urged Baltic States to put together 
broadcasts to draw away from Russian television.88 The states at most risk are Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia, who get the majority of their news from Russian sources. The United States attempted to 
create a news network of free information for those nations, but it drew few viewers.89  
In 2014, the United States Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee passed the so-called “Russian 
Aggression Prevention Bill” that authorized $10 million a year to be used to counter Russian 
propaganda in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova by financing Voice of America and Radio Free 
Europe.90 These amounts are separate from other branches of U.S. government spending like the $100 
million provided by the government to NGOs in Russia and $25 million to opposition bloggers.91 
However, this fails to impress against the $500 million a year budget that Russia Today receives to 
broadcast its services all around the world in support of the Russian government.92  
With Russia wielding an extensive psychological warfare capability, the United States government 
should reignite its information campaign to counter the attacks made by its adversaries. This could 
even include bringing back the U.S. Information Agency, which was disbanded and absorbed into the 
State Department in 1999.93 Russia has an extremely adept propaganda machine producing and 
updating articles consistently as new events occur. The key to a successful U.S. campaign is a rapid 
reaction strategy aiming to build information-based deterrence. The United States ought to broadcast 
accurate sources showing enemy intent and preparations for attack as well as portray friendly intent 
and allied military prowess. Almost immediately after a Russian article is posted, the United States 
should respond by presenting elements of the true situation and turning the false information against 
its adversaries.94 This has been happening on a small scale, with the U.S. government reaching out to 
Sony, the New York Times, and other media outlets to help tackle Russian propaganda, but these 
actions are sometimes inconsistent and ad-hoc. A clear and consistent policy aimed at information-
based deterrence would improve the ability of the United States and its allies in countering Russian 
strategic communications. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict offered fresh insight to Russia’s cyber strategies and capabilities. 
It also exposed potential areas where U.S. cyber policy can be strengthened. While analysis and 
prescriptions regarding conventional military force arrangements are beyond the scope of this article, 
understanding cyber power’s role for Russia and the United States is valuable in informing strategic 
planners and professionals about future cybered conflicts. In light of Russia’s maneuvers against 
Ukraine, the United States should promote improvements in resilience, intelligence, and information 
among itself and its allies. 
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